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Abstract Faced with having to justify programs to offices of management and bud- 
get, government agencies generate numbers which describe expected program im- 
pacts. But the assumptions or data on which these numbers are based are frequently 
suspect. as is the utility of relying on counts and modeling techniques for evaluating 
the achievement of program aims. The result is that agencies often create “concrete 
fictions.” had numbers with feet of (soft) clay. Offices of management and budget are 
able to make their methodology “hegemonic” because agencies usually have to secure 
their approval to get funding. But imposing this methodology encourages agencies to 
use research staffs more to defend against the budget office than 10 help create effective 
programs, creates differences between the expectations of government and the public, 
and fosters the overrepresentation of particular interests. 
Oxymorons come easily in government policy research. Indeed, some 
might think just the combination of the word “government” with the 
words “policy research” creates an oxymoron, caused by the conflict be- 
tween the researcher’s presumption of discovering how the world works 
and the need of government officials to construct reality to suit their goals. 
One oxymoron that describes some policy research in government is 
the notion of “concrete fictions.” Briefly, these are numbers that represent 
expected program effects and that result from nuanced calculations based 
on weak evidence and empirically unsubstantiated assumptions. While 
working at New York City’s social welfare agency, the Human Resources 
Administration (HRA), I observed the creation of concrete fictions. In 
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the next section, I discuss what concrete fictions are and how they work, 
using the example of homeless policy planning. 
HRA did not create concrete fictions as an analytic exercise. They 
were specific responses to the mayor’s Office of Management and Bud- 
get (OMB). The institutional position of OMB relative to other govern- 
ment agencies, combined with OMB’s characteristic methodology, leads 
agencies, like HRA, to create concrete fictions.’ Later in this paper I 
explain how OMB’s methodology becomes “hegemonic” as it is con- 
sciously or effectively imposed on other agencies. 
But this methodology is problematic and impacts government research, 
policymaking, the expectations of the public and of the government, and 
the representation of different interests in the decision-making process. I 
close the paper with a discussion of these issues. 
Concrete Fictions 
Often, new government programs or changes to existing ones are put 
into place with little, if any, idea as to what the effects will be. There 
are several reasons for this. Programs are designed as if the situation is 
static, while the world is changing very rapidly; prior experience is of 
limited use since the situation is almost never directly and specifically 
analogous to other circumstances; there usually is not enough time to 
carry out the necessary research; programs take time to implement as the 
context keeps changing; and implementation has effects that differ from 
what was designed. Even when these circumstances do not obtain, the 
world is sufficiently complex that important unintended and unanticipated 
consequences are likely to occur. 
One response to this dilemma would be for officials to say something 
like “We’re instituting this program in the hope that it reduces or solves 
problem x .  Here’s why we think it may have this result. But we don’t have 
any good evidence this will happen. We really cannot say whether or not 
this outcome will occur.” 
The last two sentences are unlikely to be uttered, publicly or even inside 
government. Instead, analysts create concrete fictions-estimates of pro- 
gram effects expressed in the form of numbers that result from seemingly 
real and very detailed calculations of program impact but that are con- 
I .  ’Ihis is not the only reason why agencies create cmmte fictions. For example, govern- 
ments may need them to respond politically to those wtsidc government who want to limit 
government’s xope. 
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structed on dubious or unsubstantiated data and assumptions. What makes 
the estimates concrete is that they take the form of a number-hard, pre- 
cise and, in modem government, something a computer can mull over- 
and the calculations leading to the number are very detailed; the more de- 
tailed, the better. What makes them fiction is that the data underlying the 
calculations are frequently guesses, sometimes ill-informed guesses, and 
most, if not all, of the necessary assumptions can rarely be empirically 
grounded.* 
An example is in order. Trying to deal with New York City’s homeless 
family problem, the Human Resources Administration devised a five-year 
plan. One feature was a group of programs to prevent families from need- 
ing to use the city’s homeless shelters. Programs included identifying 
families at risk of losing their housing and taking steps to prevent this from 
occurring by, for example, paying rent to prevent eviction or arranging for 
legal counsel in housing court. 
Table 1 reports calculations carried out for the 1989 progress report on 
the five-year plan for homeless families (Grinker 1989). It shows the end 
of fiscal year (FY) impact of prevention programs on the family shelter 
population. The number in each cell reports or estimates the end-of-fiscal- 
year impact of each program above the FY 1987 effect. (Impacts were 
expressed relative to 1987 for political reasons.) Thus, the number 16 in 
the column headed June 1990 means there were expected to be sixteen 
fewer families in city shelters on 30 June 1990 because of changes in 
the eviction prevention programs than there would have been on that date 
without these  change^.^ I will describe how this number was created. 
Eviction prevention programs consisted of two separate efforts that 
tried to help families avoid being evicted by their landlords; these pro- 
grams were the Housing Court Liaison (HCL) and the Legal Aid Eviction 
Assistance Demonstration Projects (Legal Aid). HCL paid rent to pre- 
vent eviction for nonpayment, and the Legal Aid program provided legal 
counseling in housing court for families in danger of losing tenancy. 
2 .  The data problems may be particularly acute in social welfare research, especially when 
studies rely on those who set up and run programs to supply numerical information. Because thcse 
people are usually not interested in research or planning and b e c a w  they fear the accountability 
that numbers portend. “program people” tend not to count very well. 
3. As the reader follows this description of how a concrete fiction was created, she or he may 
well ask if it is worth all this effort to measure such meager effects. However, just because the 
model was doubtful does not mean that implementing the programs would be a waste of time. 
The estimations could be wrong or h r e  might be other benefits not calculated here and, per- 
haps, not calculable in an arithmetic way. For examples of the benefits of these programs that I 
do not report, see New York Stale Department of Social Services 1990. 
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Table 1 Impact of Preventive Programs on New York City’s Homeless 
Family Shelter Population at the End of the Fiscal Year, 1988-1992 
Program 
Reduction in Number of Families 
June June June June June 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
City-Wide Expansion of Housing Alert 9 34 113 130 137 
Eviction Prevention 5 12 16 19 20 
Apartment Sharing 0 0 73 88 95 
Permanent Housing Waiting List 0 0 0 0 78 
Total Decrease in Shelter Size 14 46 202 237 330 
Source. Human Resources Administration. City of New York. 
The account of how the calculations were made is a little tedious. But 
that’s the point: the more numbers used and the more nuanced the esti- 
mation procedure, the more “real” expected program effects seem to be.4 
Most important, effects are defined as lowering the city shelter popula- 
tion because that translates into lower direct costs for the city-a primary 
OMB aim. And convincing the budget office to open the city’s wallet a 
little wider is what this exercise is mostly about. 
There are three parts to the calculation. The first two estimate the num- 
ber of families not entering shelters over a year because of rent payments 
in housing court (HCL) or because of legal counseling (Legal Aid). The 
third estimates the impact on the shelter population at the end of the fiscal 
year of those families not entering the shelters. 
Housing Court Liaison 
According to program figures, HCL paid rent for 2,789 families in FY 
1989,605 above the FY 1987 level of 2,184. Since there was no evidence 
peculiar to this program suggesting the rate at which families served were 
prevented from becoming homeless, analysts used the rate suggested by a 
study of another program which had a related, though different, popula- 
tion. This study suggested 2 percent of families served would have entered 
city shelters. Thus, since 605 0.02 = 12, the number of families not 
4. While the description can get tedious. these calculations use very simple arithmetic and 
are not very complicated compared to estimations of effects in other policy areas. 
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entering the homeless system because of the HCL program for each fiscal 
year was deemed to be 12. 
This calculation was relatively straightforward. But the accuracy of the 
family count is unknown, and relying on a study of a different population 
for the crucial percentage is a major assumption whose error could not 
be known. 
Legal Aid Projects 
To figure out the success of Legal Aid programs, HRA estimated the 
following equation: 
N =  F * S * H ,  
where 
N = number of families prevented from entering shelters, 
F = total number of families helped by the Legal Aid programs, 
S = proportion of families Legal Aid successfully helped avoid evic- 
H = proportion successfully helped who would have entered shelters. 
The first step was to estimate F, the total number of families the programs 
would help. Over a sixteen-month period ending on 31 July 1988, the 
three demonstration programs handled 1,691 cases, according to HRA 
counts. This is 105.7 per month or 1,268 per year, which was projected 
onto 1990. 
This measurement was relatively easy, as it required a count of previ- 
ous behavior and a simple inference. But for political reasons and due to 
the nature of the activity being counted, HRA counts tended to be unreli- 
able. An evaluation of these programs by the New York State Department 
of Social Services (1990), relying on counts from program operators, 
showed a much higher case load. And whether such a simple projection 
is justified is an issue worth raising. 
The next step was to estimate the proportion of families successfully 
served, that is, whose tenancy was maintained. There were two relevant 
measures of proportion. The first counted families who were evicted but 
who successfully fought the eviction in court. An HRA study estimated 
that these constituted 12 percent of the total number of families handled 
by Legal Aid.s In order to prevent double counting with an overlapping 
tion, and 
5. More specifically. this was the percentage successfully helped by the Brooklyn Legal Aid 
project, one of thnx such projects. Eccause changes in 1989 made all three projects conform to 
thc Brooklyn project. estimations relied on statistics from Brooklyn. 
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program, this number was reduced by 6 percent, the percentage arbi- 
trarily expected to be handled by that other program. However, there was 
no evidence on the extent to which programs overlapped or on how long 
“successfully” aided families stayed housed. 
The second measure of proportion covered evicted families who used 
Legal Aid help to settle out of court. But this does not mean that families 
were permanently established in their apartments. In general, the settle- 
ment was a temporary arrangement. Such families were estimated to be 
50 percent of the total caseload. But since there was no way to know 
how long “temporary” would be, it was arbitrarily decided that only a 
quarter would be able to stay in their apartments long enough for their 
court settlement to be counted successful. Thus, 50 percent was reduced 
to 12.5 percent. Obviously, this number has little behind it but arbitrary 
judgments. To calculate the estimated success rate of the Legal Aid pro- 
grams over and above FY 1987, we sum the two proportions: 0.06 + 
0.125 = 0.185. 
The third step was to estimate the proportion of successfully helped 
cases that would otherwise have entered the shelters. To do this, the num- 
ber of evicted public assistance families entering the shelters was divided 
by the total number of public assistance families evicted in a year: 1,267 / 
12,500 = 0.101. The first number was derived from a rate estimated 
in a New York University study that more or less met academic sur- 
vey standards; the second was from HRA records. Thus, these estimates 
were relatively stronger than others in this task, though HRA records are 
notoriously unreliable. 
We then multiply the three estimates, 
N = 1268*0.185.0.101 
= 24. 
This product is added to the HCL program number, estimated earlier, 
yielding a total of 36 families prevented from needing to use the city 
shelters in 1990 due to the city’s eviction prevention programs. 
Shelter Population Impact 
A final step remains. Preventing 36 families from entering the shelters 
over the course of a year does not mean they all would have remained shel- 
tered by the last day of the fiscal year (the day of reckoning in Table l). 
Some might enter in October and stay a week or two months; others might 
enter in July and stay the year. So, the effect on the population at the end 
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of the fiscal year has to be calculated. To do this, the following formula 
was estimated: 
I = ( F * ( ( S S * M S )  + LS)) + E(FP-LS-ER), 
where 
I = impact on end of fiscal year census, 
F = number of families prevented from entering shelters in current 
SS = percentage of families staying less than one year among new 
MS = mean length of stay for families staying less than one year, 
LS = percentage of families remaining in shelter one year or longer 
FP = number of families prevented from entering shelters in a previous 
ER = exit rate for families sheltered more than one year. 
Earlier, I showed how HRA estimated the number of families prevented 
from entering shelters. To estimate the rates at which families left the 
shelters, an HRA study examined the shelter history of a sample of fami- 
lies entering shelters over one month. This study provided estimates of 
the proportion of entering families that leave every 30 days, up to 270 
days. Because of time limitations and poor data quality, direct estimates 
for more than nine months were not possible. Since estimates for 360 
days were required, estimates for the final three months were extrapolated 
from the previous nine. The results showed that 74.6 percent of families 
left within a year, that is, 25.4 percent remained more than a year. 
HRA also relied on this study to estimate the mean length of stay for 
new entrants leaving the shelters within a year (“short-term stayers”). 
The equation used was 
fiscal year, 
entrants, 
among new entrants, 
fiscal year, and 
M = ( N P -  D) I N ,  
where 
M = highest possible mean number of days in shelters, 
D = number of days in cumulated 30-day periods, and 
N = total sample size 
N P  = number in sample exiting per cumulated 30-day period, 
The result of this calculation was 87.5 days, or 24.3 percent of a year. 
As the study generating these estimates was wried out on the popula- 
tion of interest, with data better than usually available and with attention 
to data problems, the numbers for the first nine months are more reli- 
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able than other estimates reported in this paper. Even so, the monthly 
error terms get large, and the need to extrapolate for the last three months 
introduces unknown and unknowable error into the calculations. 
The final number to be estimated was the rate at which families shel- 
tered at least one year would remain to the end of a second, third, or 
subsequent years. The estimates for the exit rates were as follows: Re- 
maining to the end of a second year-34 percent; to the end of a third- 
17 percent; to the end of a fourth-2 percent; to the end of a f i f t h 4  
percent. The study that generated the estimates was done well, but of ne- 
cessity used data several years old (in a continuously changing system) 
and known to contain Severe errors. 
We now have estimates for all the terms in the equation calculating the 
impact of eviction prevention programs on the shelter population: 
I = ( F C * ( ( S S * M S )  + LS)) + E(FP*LS*ER)). 
For FY 1990 this computes as 
I = ((36*((0.746*0.243) + 0.254)) + ((600.254.0.34) 
= 16. 
That is, on 30 June 1990, the city shelters were expected to house 16 
fewer families because of these programs. 
Thus is born a concrete fiction. The calculations are simple arithmetic 
and the model is not complicated. It would not be hard to create more 
sophisticated and impenetrable concrete fictions. But this example dis- 
plays the procedure's essential features and problems. The calculations 
are mathematical and try to be nuanced. The data, however, have prob- 
lems that undermine both the arithmetic and the would-be realism of the 
nuances: either their reliability is unknown (in a technical sense) or they 
do not measure the thing of most interest. And the needed assumptions 
are either completely arbitrary or their empirical basis is very limited. 
Plausibly changing assumptions or the data are not hard to do. The New 
York State Department of Social Services (NYSDSS 1990) also estimated 
the impact of the Legal Aid programs on the number of families entering 
shelters. By relying on Legal Aid's estimate of the number of families 
served (instead of the HRA study used here) and by estimating differently 
the number of evicted families who were sheltered, NYSDSS estimated 
the Legal Aid programs would prevent 432 families from entering shelters 
over the course of a year, instead of the 24 estimated by HRA. 
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Tho Origins of Concrete Fictions 
Why are concrete fictions created? The answer I propose has two parts, 
one institutional, the other methodological. Both center on OMB. 
The institutional part of the answer concerns the relationship between 
OMB and other city agencies. The analogy that comes to mind is the re- 
lationship between Wall Street investment banks and private corporations: 
the former’s control over money the latter needs makes corporate decision 
making responsive to the concerns of investment banks. The basic role of 
OMB in New York City government is no different, that is, it enhances the 
mayor’s control over agency spending throughout government.6 As such, 
OMB has an institutional predisposition to say no to funding requests, 
especially for new, unproven programs. And since, in general, an agency 
will be funded for programs only if it can convince OMB to change its 
implicit (and sometimes explicit) no to a yes, it must be able to respond to 
OMB. This response is most effective when done on OMB’s terms, that 
is, by using OMB’s methodology. 
Life at OMB centers on numbers. Obviously, this is largely due to 
OMB’s mission to budget, which necessarily involves numbers. Further, 
OMB cumntly is populated by people skilled in the principles and tech- 
niques of accounting, finance, and economics. If they are not accountants, 
they are, increasingly, people trained in public administration programs 
that are modeled after business administration schools and their emphasis 
on instilling these principles and techniques. In particular, formal mod- 
eling techniques, with their reliance on mathematics and the would-be 
sophisticated computer-driven manipulation of numbers, are especially 
valued. Thus, what defines OMB’s methodology is not just the centrality 
of numbers but the importance of finance, accounting, and economic 
principles and the critical use of modeling techniques. 
Because of OMB’s institutional relationship to other agencies, it can 
effectively impose this methodology on other agencies. In this sense, 
OMB’s is a “hegemonic methodology.” a way of arriving at decisions 
that dominates, if not eliminates, other possible approaches. To maxi- 
mize an agency’s funding chances, the value of proposed new programs 
or changes to existing programs ought to be numerically justified, using 
a statistical or mathematical model based on principles or ideas from ac- 
6. This is similar to the relationship between the federal OMB and presidential power (Wood 
and Waterman 1991: 804-805). 
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counting. finance, or economics. Using such a methodology is a first line 
of offense and establishes an agency’s credibility and legitimacy in its 
arguments with OMB. 
One example of OMB’s methodological hegemony was the conflict in- 
side the New York City government over how much a permanent housing 
program would reduce the homeless shelter population. Because hundreds 
of millions of dollars was at stake, OMB, HRA, and the Mayor’s Office 
met to decide the issue. OMB and HRA each came with their required 
mathematical and statistical models. Without these, it is unlikely HRA 
could have secured such a meeting; it would have lost the issue at lower 
levels of the decision-making process. But each agency had very divergent 
estimates-concrete fictions-of the shelter bed turnover rate that was 
critical to the program effects each model estimated. That each agency 
had no good data to support its estimate of this statistic was not seriously 
addressed; most of the discussion was about the conflicting impacts on the 
shelter population that the models gave. OMB showed that the housing 
program would drastically decrease the shelter population; HRA showed 
it would cause a small decline.’ Responding to HRA, OMB’s director 
objected to spending large sums of money for a program that would not 
cause a large decrease in the shelter population. That is, he took as the 
only goal something that was numerically defineable and responsive to 
modeling-the shelter population. HRA’s rejoinder was a general social 
welfare argument: that providing permanent housing was worth doing 
because it would house many homeless people and improve their lives 
even if the shelter population did not decrease much. But HRA’s models 
could not show these outcomes, because they could only model the shel- 
ter population. The response from OMB’s director was right on cue, “Of 
course you have to make the social welfare argument.” That is, HRA 
was talking about the well-being of homeless people in general and did 
not have a model showing numerical results. So, from the perspective of 
the hegemonic methodology (in the person of the OMB director), it was 
forced into making a nonnumerical and, hence, less powerful argument. 
7.  One might think that OMB would try to show that the program would not work very well 
and that HRA would try to show that it would. But OMB wanted to cut other parts of HRA’s 
budget, contingent on its showing the disputed p r o m  to be highly effective. and HRA was 
trying to prevent these cuts. 
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Problems with th OMB Approach 
There are many problems with OMB’s approach.s The ones I wish to 
discuss are how it emphasizes manipulating numbers but ignores the ques- 
tions of what the numbers measure and, more fundamentally, whether 
numbers are the correct way to think about understanding some phenome- 
non. OMB overemphasizes modeling to the detriment of measurement, 
and some benefits just cannot be captured by counting but are not any the 
less important. 
The usefulness of any count depends critically on the conceptualiza- 
tion of what that count is a count of and on how well the count is carried 
out: in short, on validity and reliability. OMB modelers are not as con- 
scious about these issues as they are, say, about problems of model as- 
sumptions or of particular calculation techniques? As a result, for ex- 
ample, an elaborate OMB five-year model for dealing with the problem 
of homeless adults, on which at least one person-year of time had been 
spent, was scrapped when people who did think about measurement (not 
OMB) demonstrated that OMB’s numbers were not valid. Discussions 
with OMB tend to be about how the model works, not how valid or 
reliable the numbers are. 
A second problem with this methodology is that some things are just 
hard to translate into a count. This might be particularly true in social 
welfare, where improvement in the quality of life is a key outcome but 
which can be very hard to measure.IO 
Moreover, perhaps there are important outcomes that simply cannot 
be counted at all. Again, this may be particularly true in social welfare 
policy, whose goals are to restore or to maintain intangible elements like 
the webs of kinship and friendship that ought to matter when making 
policy about homeless families. The word intangibk conveys that what- 
ever “it” is, it is not going to be disclosed in some integer. A home- 
less family, for example, may move from its neighborhood into a shelter 
8. Stone (1988) discusses extensively the many problems in policy-making of modeling 
methodologies. 
9. Apparently, their mining either c a w s  or abets this problem. A former HRA colleague. 
a graduate of Harvard’s Kennedy School who was a teaching assistant in a statistics coum 
(k., she is methodologically adept), complained that she was taught well how to create and 
manipulate models, but no m e  told her how to get good numbers in the first place. 
10. We encounter this problem in other fields where numerid measurement is not m y .  For 
example. how do we couot damage to the environment in ordcr to include that damage as a 
production cost (Tietcnbcrg IWI)? 
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and then to a government-allocated apartment in another part of town. 
Can we measure the cost (or profit) to the city of moving a family away 
from family and friends, from familiar surroundings, or from the schools, 
churches, and other institutions to which they were socially and emotion- 
ally attached?" Unlike my previous critique, this objection amounts to 
a rejection of OMB's methodology, because it states that there are ways 
of knowing apart from counting and modeling that are just as valid and 
that should be followed in policy-making.'* 
The Impact of a Hegemonic Methodology 
At least four areas feel the impact of OMB's methodological hegemony.I3 
One is the kind of things researchers in government do; another is the 
goal of policy-making; a third is the creation of discrepancies between 
the expectations of the public and the government; and fourth is interest 
representation. 
Because of OMB's methodology, agencies create staffs which tend to 
do a certain kind of research, one that is based on numbers and models, 
so as to arm the agency in its battles with OMB. Consider New York's 
five-year plans for the homeless. Although originally mandated by the city 
council, the plans became important for getting money committed to the 
homeless problem. The kinds of things one needed to know to carry out 
the modeling for the plan strongly affected what was researched. Concrete 
fictions are fictional, in part, because the needed information does not 
I I .  On the importance of kinship relations in homelessness, see Rossi (n.d.). A study of 
families who left New Yo& City shelters to housing that they, not the government. had found 
showed that a majority ~tumed to the same neighborhoods, even the same addresses. that they 
had left to enter the shelters (Levy 1989: 6). This suggests that families want to live in areas with 
which they are familiar. (There are other explanations, which do not require such an interest: 
the families had no other option but to rcturn 10 the homes they had left, or, since their contacts 
for learning about new housing are likely 10 live in their fomer neighborhoods and these con- 
tacts will know most about housing in that area, families will most probably return to their old 
neighborhood, even if they p r c f e d  to live elsewhere.) 
12. Midgley (1991: 22) expmses the point well: "There is no single, infallible form of knowl- 
edge, forming a standard against which all others must be measured and by whose help they will 
all finally be made impregnable. Instead, there arc many different ways of knowing, each with 
their [sic] own standards and their own suitable kinds of evidence." 
13. The concept of hegemonic methodology has a wider application than just to OMB's 
methodology. And the conditions for a methodology to become hegemonic can be dtfferent from 
those in this case. Within HRA, for example, the hegemonic methodology was that of social 
work. By contrast with, say, the OMB methodology. the HRA's tends to focus on individual 
persons or families as the policy-affected unit, not counts of these people; to pay attention to 
concrrte conditions in problem solving, rather than abstract principles; and to be particularistic 
in policy formation, rather than universalistic. 
McAllister . Concrete Fictions 103 
exist. Thus, the five-year plans became the documents driving homeless 
research.14 
In some sense, this is as it should be. We want government to research 
what it is doing or plans to do in dealing with homelessness. On the other 
hand, because it uses numbers-based modeling, it tends to ignore useful 
program ideas as well as crucial real world conditions that cannot be 
evaluated in models. This is especially true with problems such as home- 
lessness, which is relatively nascent (at least in its “newer” form) and 
encompasses problems other than just lack of housing, and where policy 
failure is more common than success. 
The second impact of OMB’s methodology is to make changes in num- 
bers the goal of policy, perhaps at the expense of unmeasured “qualita- 
tive” effects. This causes the numbers themselves to be interpreted as the 
problem, a form of reification. 
The danger in formulating policies to change numbers is evident in 
education, when we train students how to take tests rather than how to 
think. To the extent that tests only measure the ability to take tests, posi- 
tive changes in scores will not reflect a successful educational system, 
that is, one which teaches students how to think, though we may believe 
they do.IS 
The same problem is found in social welfare policies that focus on mov- 
ing numbers in a “positive” direction, for example, by reducing the popu- 
lation in city homeless shelters, rather than trying to end homelessness. 
If the number given for the shelter population measured homelessness, 
then reducing this number would indicate that the problem of poor people 
without homes was being solved. To the extent the number does not actu- 
ally measure homelessness, policies aimed at changing the number, even 
if successful, will have less of an impact on the problem. 
But worse, we will think we are ending homelessness. For many people 
in New York City government, the homeless problem was synonymous 
with the number of people in the shelters, and the way to resolve the prob- 
lem was synonymous with running accounting models that showed how 
this number would decline. 
For instance, my first reading of New York City’s five-year plan dis- 
14. The five-year plans did not drive all research projects. though there was a tendency in this 
direction. 
15. This and the homeless example I am about to give simply demonstrate the policy impli- 
cations of the kind of thinking that Rter Medawar described as being “on all fours with saying 
that a patient’s temperature is his health or that the time he takes to run a mile is his degree of 
athleticism” (Medawar 1982: 12). 
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tressed me, because it did not deal with the fullness of the homeless 
problem I encountered every day on New York’s streets. How aware were 
my colleagues, who put this document together, that it did not bear the 
strongest relationship to the street reality of the problem? Quite aware, it 
turns out, but the constraints of the hegemonic methodology, the adminis- 
tration’s political conservatism, and a fiscal interest in decreasing the city 
budget combined to make them deal with only a piece of the problem. 
But this piece necessarily became the whole problem, as daily business 
transactions centered about what was happening to the numbers and how 
well the plan was being met. The reification of numbers as the problem 
was too seductive to resist. 
A third impact of OMB’s methodological hegemony is that focusing 
attention on the wrong thing, or, at least, not the whole thing, leads to 
differences between the expectations of the government and the public. 
Having defined numbers as the problem, government officials tend to be- 
lieve that when the numbers improve, the situation is getting better, even 
though it may not, in reality, have improved much or at all. From their 
daily experiences, the public will probably know this, and an adversarial 
media will certainly emphasize that the situation has not improved. The 
result is a discrepancy between what the government thinks it has accom- 
plished after much hard work and a lot of money and what the citizenry 
thinks of government’s ability to solve problems. Officials become per- 
plexed or belligerent, and citizens become distrusting or angry. 
Policy-making for New York City’s homeless families provides an ex- 
ample. From June 1988 to June 1990, the number of sheltered home- 
less families declined by almost 40 percent and the Dickensian “welfare 
hotels” were almost emptied. City officials took great pride in this accom- 
plishment, they themselves almost astonished at their success in changing 
the direction of numbers that had been rising for almost a decade. 
However, the public, especially the media and homeless advocates, 
focused on other homeless families: the hundred thousand families who 
are doubled-up with relatives and friends, or the thousands who live in 
substandard housing. To city officials, you can’t win for trying; to those 
outside government, government can’t do anything right.16 
16. Something similar occurred in New York City’s attempt to improve its subways in the 
1980s. After years of multibillion dollar capital expenditures, tremendous institutional reorga- 
nization, and hard work, the Metropolitan Transit Authority reported great improvement in the 
subways: the number of graffiti-free cars, the number of cars with all lights and all doors work- 
ing. the number of new cars, and so forth. Imagine the authority’s frustration when a survey it 
commissioned showed the public did not see that the subways had improved. 
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Part of the explanation for this mutual enmity is a government focused 
on numbers that, at best, addressed only part of the problem. It was not 
that city government was wrong, for the decline in the shelter population 
was sought by everyone, but that its focus on numbers caused officials 
to ignore or play down those parts of the problem the numbers did not 
capture. The problem is broader and deeper than the shelter numbers can 
convey. This is what those outside government tend to see. Mistrust in 
government and a belief that government is inept result. 
Finally, as we just saw, the prevailing hegemonic methodology has an 
impact on the representation of interests in policy-making. Hugh Heclo 
(1974: 305) has written that “[glovernments puzzle as well as ‘power’,” 
but the form of that puzzling can affect for whom governments power. 
Creating models that define the homeless family problem as the need 
to empty shelters suggests that, once the shelters are empty, the need 
of very poor families for adequate housing will not be on the govern- 
ment’s agenda. When that happens, there will be no policies addressing 
other aspects of the problem, such as doubled- and tripled-up households, 
substandard housing, or inadequate incomes. 
Further, to the exent that a methodology cannot represent certain inter- 
ests, these interests may find another methodology to use. For the home- 
less, this has usually meant the methodology of law, as advocates file 
suits to represent clients who have problems not adequately addressed by 
models, by five-year plans, or, more generally, by the government’s will 
or ability (Kirschheirner 1989-90). This is not to say that other methods 
work any better to resolve the problem. In New York City, for example, 
the clash between legal methods and modeling has resulted in chaos, 
frustration, and a worsening problem. This result is due, in part, to the 
inadequacy of legal reasoning and to fundamental incongruities between 
the two approaches.” 
This paper is not arguing that, in making policy, numbers and model- 
ing are useless or that OMB’s methodology is “another form of poetry” 
(Stone 1988). It is an argument for paying much greater attention to mea- 
surement and to the assumptions that are a model’s foundation. I want 
to say with Midgley (see footnote 12) that there are different ways of 
knowing, and ways other than OMB’s should be a part of policy-making. 
17. Othcr factors and methodologies plso help explain homeless policy-making in New Yo& 
City. Surely, fiscal problems. ideological conservatism. administrative constraints. and institu- 
tional and electoral politics have also bcen important. 
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